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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), Australia's 
income contingent charge mechanism, and analyses its impact on the social composition of 
university participation.   We analyse university participation data from three cohorts of 
young Australians.  The first cohort completed their schooling prior to the introduction of 
HECS, the second following its introduction and the third after the scheme was amended 
substantially.  We find that the social composition of participants was different in 1999 
from that of 1988.  However, the distribution was more equal than it was in the late 1980s.  
That outcome reflected the growth in participation in the middle of the wealth distribution, 
which was stronger than growth at either the top or the bottom of the distribution.  Other 
aspects of university participation also changed: participation grew more strongly among 
females than males.  We find no evidence that participation fell among 'marginal decision 
makers' – those who, while at school, said they did not intend to study at university.  We 
conclude that HECS did not act to discourage university participation in general or among 






In 1989 the Australian government
1 introduced a higher education financing policy 
that has influenced the way higher education tuition is thought about in that and other 
countries. Its defining characteristic is that if students choose to so do, their tuition 
charge is paid depending on their future incomes. Since then several other countries
2 
have introduced variants of (so-called) income contingent loans for the payment of 
fees, and some additional countries are in the process of considering the applicability 
of this type of approach.
3 
For Australia the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) replaced a no-fees 
approach to higher education financing. At the time - and since - the justification for 
the introduction of a student charge has been easy to understand, for the following 
reasons.  
First, the government was faced with the prospect of a burgeoning demand for higher 
education services, services at the time financed almost solely from general taxation 
revenue. A demographic bulge and rapidly increasing high school retention rates 
meant the emergence of pressures for a considerable expansion of university places.  
Second was the widely held view – supported by available evidence - that having a 
higher education system financed almost completely from tax revenue was regressive 
in income distribution terms. Finally, the 1980s (and beyond) was a period of 
considerable fiscal parsimony that had lead and continues to lead to a questioning of 
the rationale for government spending in even the most well established areas of the 
public sector. 
 
As noted, the defining characteristic of HECS is that the charge is collected depending 
on a former student’s income, with no payments being required when former 
students’ incomes fall below a given threshold. At the time the major rationale for 
income contingency was to have a charging system that would maximise the 
participation in higher education of the less advantaged. It was believed that having 
repayments depend on future income would have a minimal impact on both aggregate 
student demand and the participation of prospective students from relatively 
disadvantaged backgrounds. The point of the current paper is the provision of 
evidence relevant to this expectation. 
 
The discussion following makes several contributions. First, from the perspective of 
economic theory, in Section 2 we present a taxonomy of student financing policies 
with respect to their likely implications for the access of the poor. 
 
Second, we describe HECS with respect to both charge levels and repayment 
parameters. It is of considerable interest that in 1997 major changes occurred to both, 
and these are explained in Section 3. In this section estimates are presented of the 
                                                            
1  Following the recommendation of the committee set up to consider financing options for higher 
education, chaired by Neville Wran.  See Financing Higher Education, AGPS, 1988. 
2    These include New Zealand in 1991, Chile in 1994, South Africa in 1996 and  the UK in 1998 
(with revisions in 2003).  
3   The World Bank and other international agencies have recommended, or are considering, the 
viability of income related approaches to higher education financing in Malaysia, Hungary, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and the Philippines. An important critique of the approach with respect to 
applications to developing countries is provided in Johnstone and Aemero (2001).  
 
2 
effects of both the original and the 1997 HECS arrangements on internal rates of 
return to higher education, for both men and women. It seems to be the case that 
neither the first nor the more recent versions of HECS had significant effects on the 
average returns to private investment in university training.  
 
Third, and most importantly, in Section 5 we present new evidence on the effects of 
HECS for the access of disadvantaged prospective students, after we describe our 
data, methodology and the existing literature on this subject in Section 4. The new 
estimates are undertaken with respect to both the introduction of HECS, and the very 
significant changes introduced in 1997. The available panel data allow the adoption of 
two distinct approaches: estimation of the changing effect on enrolments of measures 
of family wealth; and the importance of the introduction and changes to HECS on 
young people’s expectations of their likely future education experiences. The bottom 
line seems to be that the Australian income contingent charge has had no discernible 
effects on the access of the disadvantaged to higher education. 
 
2  Economic Theory: What is the Correct Approach to Student 
Financing? 
 
2 (a) Introduction 
 
Several different policy approaches to student charges for higher education, currently 
in operation internationally, are now analysed with respect to their social and 
economic implications. It will be argued that a charge is justified, and that the best 
way for students to pay is via an income contingent arrangement, such as HECS
4. 
 
2 (b) A No Charge System 
 
Many, although increasingly fewer, countries do not charge for higher education. 
What this means can be understood through reference to standard economic   
principles, now explained briefly. 
 
A role for government is to help ensure the production of optimal quantities of goods 
and services. In some circumstances this requires public subsidies equal to the 
marginal value of the externality associated with an activity. These externalities are 
considered to take the form of reduced criminal activity, more informed public debate 
and technological change and economic growth. 
 
Within this framework all charging systems implicitly place a value on externalities. 
For example, having no charge suggests that societal benefits at least equal the size of 
the subsidy. While there is little agreement on the size of higher education 
externalities, it is certainly clear for Australia that the process delivers important 
private benefits to graduates
5. 
 
The other issue related to not charging for higher education is that of equity. There is 
no doubt that university students are more likely to come from privileged 
                                                            
4 For a related discussion, see Chapman and Ryan (2002). 
5  See Borland, Dawkins, Johnson and Williams (2000).    
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backgrounds, and it is also true that graduates do well in the labour market. A no 
charge system is unquestionably regressive
6.  
 
2 (c) Up-front Fees with No Government Intervention  
 
If there should be a charge, how should it be paid? One possibility would be to offer 
subsidies to universities to cover the assumed value of externalities, but beyond that 
allow the institutions to charge fees, with there being no other financing assistance 
provided. Such an arrangement would unambiguously be poor policy. In this context 
the critical issue relates to the major borrowing problem, often referred to as “capital 
market failure”. 
 
The issue is that some prospective students would not have the resources to pay the 
fees and would need to approach a bank for a loan. However, banks will be reluctant 
to loan to students because of problems associated with default. An education loan is 
risky for a bank since, in the event of default - and unlike a housing loan - the bank 
has no collateral to sell. This implies that, without assistance, banks will not be 
interested in the underwriting of human capital investments.  
 
Thus prospective students without sufficient financial resources to cover fees will not 
be able to enrol. There will be three important effects: a loss of talent, and thus a cost 
to the whole society; a loss of opportunity to individuals; and a cementing of the 
nexus between family background and a person’s lifetime income, meaning that such 
a system is regressive. 
 
 
2 (d) Up-Front Fees with Government Subsidised Bank Assistance  
 
A possible solution to the capital market problem described above is used in many 
countries and involves government-assisted bank loans to students with low family 
incomes. The most important form of public sector support is the guarantee of 
repayment of the debt to the bank in the event of default. While this seems to address 
the capital market failure, there are several problems.  
 
The first is that students’ access to loans is usually means-tested on the basis of family 
income. This then presumes equal access of individuals to family resources; however, 
those in charge of the distribution of household finances to household members may 
not have the prospective student’s view of the value to the student of education. This 
implies that some not qualifying for bank loan assistance will not be able to pay fees. 
If so, outcomes will not be optimal with the associated costs of lack of access noted 
above. 
 
The second problem is default. For the government this is costly since bank-financed 
student loans default rates are very high
7. And if there is a guarantee that defaults will 
be paid for by the government banks will put little effort into debt recovery. Default is 
very expensive for taxpayers. 
 
                                                            
6 See Chapman (1997) and Chapman and Ryan (2002). 
7  Harrison (1995) notes that in US Propriety Colleges the default rate is as high as 50 per cent. The 
average default rate for student loans is around 15-30 per cent (Wran Committee Report, 1988).  
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Students also face an important default issue. This is that some may be reluctant to 
borrow for fear of not meeting future repayment obligations, with concomitant 
damage to a person’s credit reputation (and thus access to future borrowing, for 
example, for a house). A consequence is that some eligible prospective students will 
not be prepared to take bank loans. This problem can be traced, in part, to the fact that 
bank loan repayments are insensitive to the borrower’s financial circumstances and 
are thus associated with default risk for students.  
 
 
2 (e) Income Contingent Charge Mechanisms 
 
A final approach to student financing involves income contingent loans. There are 
several forms of an ICL, and in broad terms these can be described as ICL with risk-
pooling, graduate taxes and ICL with risk-sharing. They have quite different 
implications. 
 
A risk-pooling ICL involves a cohort of students being obligated to repay in total the 
debt of the group, and the best known example is that of the Yale Plan, described and 
critically analysed in Nerlove (1975) and Feldman (1976). Graduate taxes involve an 
on-going tax surcharge and there has been no practical experience of their effects. 
Barr (2000) provides a useful critique of the consequences of graduate taxes.  
 
HECS is an ICL with risk-sharing, meaning that taxpayers share the risks of non-
repayment in the sense that the government covers the costs. The attraction of risk-
sharing income contingent schemes is that they might be able to be designed to avoid 
the problems associated with alternative financing policies outlined above
8,9.  The 
advantages of this type of application of an ICL are as follows. 
 
First, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is universal. 
That is, no students would be denied access through the imposition of means-testing 
arrangements that could exclude some potential students whose parents or partners are 
unwilling to pay an up-front fee. 
 
Second, given an efficient collection mechanism, there should be no default issue for 
the government if, for example, the tax system is used to collect the debt, since it is 
extremely difficult for the vast majority of graduates to avoid repayment
10,
11. There is 
arguably a trivial “default” issue in that some students will not pay back in full as 
risk-sharing income contingent systems are designed to excuse some former student’s 
payments because their lifetime incomes are too low
12.  
 
                                                            
8  For theoretical analysis see Chapman (1997). 
9 This requires an efficient collection mechanism, and it should be recognised that in many countries 
the collection of an income contingent loan might not be possible (Johnstone and Aemero, 2001)). 
10 At least for Australia, this is essential because the Australian Taxation Office is the only institution 
with reasonably good information on a former student’s income.  
11  An additional concern relates to former students emigrating. A solution to this loss of revenue is 
offered in Barr (2001). 
12  Harding (1995) calculates that the total repayments remaining uncollected because of the nature of 
HECS would be of the order of 15-25 per cent for the original scheme (when the repayment conditions 
were much more generous for the student  (before the 1997 changes)).   
 
5 
Third, because repayments depend on incomes, there should be no student default 
concerns related to an inability to pay. That is, once an individual’s income 
circumstances determine repayment – and so long as the repayment parameters are 
sufficiently generous – it is almost impossible for a former student to default because 
of a lack of financial resources.  
 
The above provides the conceptual basis and motivation for the current study. The 
essential issue concerns the effects of a risk-sharing ICL with respect to the potential 
of such an approach to deal with the capital market failure associated with financing 
higher education. That is, have the introduction of, and changes to, HECS affected the 
access of the disadvantaged to higher education? An obvious way to begin the 




3  HECS: Description and Estimates of Aggregate Likely Effects 
 
3 (a) Introduction 
 
An obvious empirical issue associated with the institution of and changes to HECS 
concerns its possible effects on aggregate demand for higher education. This is 
addressed indirectly in what follows by considering the implications of HECS for 
average internal rates of return by sex. This is now addressed with respect to the three 
phases explained above: before there was a charge, after 1989 when the scheme was 
introduced, and for post-1997, when the scheme was made significantly less generous 
for students and graduates.  
 
Consequently we describe the policy setting in 1988 and for both 1993 and 1999; that 
is, for Australian students who completed their secondary schooling in 1987, 1992 
and 1998. An important beginning is to document the nature and structure of HECS 
charges in these periods. 
 
3 (b) HECS Charges: 1993 and 1999 
 
When the Australian government instituted HECS in 1989 there was a uniform charge 
for each full-time year equivalent, and this was around $2,700 in 2003 dollars. The 
charge was indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), as were the repayment 
thresholds (explained below).  
 
In 1997 the new (Coalition) government introduced a three-tier structure with the 
charges reflecting both course costs and, in the case for Law and Nursing, an 
assessment of possible future earnings
13. Thus students who enrolled in Australian 
universities in 1999 faced tuition charges that varied by course, and these are shown 
in Table 1.  Since 1997, the HECS charges and repayment parameters described 
below have been indexed to the CPI, so the scheme in 2003 is identical in real terms 
to that implemented in 1997. 
 
The differential course charges mean that an Arts graduate who completed their 
course in three years from 1999 would have incurred a HECS debt of between 
                                                            
13  For an analysis of these changes see Chapman and Salvage (1997).  
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$10,000 and $11,000, a Science graduate a debt approaching $15,000, and a Law 
graduate (typically a four-year course) over $20,000.  These debts are indexed to 
inflation (the Consumer Price Index), but beyond this there is no real rate of interest 
on the debt. 
 
Table 1 
HECS Costs by Band: 1989, 1993 and 1999 ($1999) 
 
HECS Band  HECS Cost for 
Each Full-time 
Year of Study   
Disciplines 
1989 2,300  All  disciplines 
    
1993 2,600  All  disciplines 
    





Arts, Humanities, Social Studies/ 
Behavioural Sciences, Education, 
Visual/Performing Arts, Nursing, Justice 







Mathematics, Computing, other Health 
Sciences, Agriculture/Renewable 
Resources, Built Environment/ 
Architecture, Sciences, Engineering/ 






Law, Medicine, Medical Science, 
Dentistry, Dental Services and Veterinary 
Science 
Source:  Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs, HECS: Your Questions Answered, 1993 and 1999.   
 
 
3 (c) HECS Repayment Parameters: 1993 and 1999  
 
Students can choose to either pay their HECS charges at the time of enrolment or 
defer repayment.  Those who choose to pay their HECS charges up-front receive a 
discount of 25 per cent, meaning that in effect HECS incorporates a blunt form of a 
real interest rate. However, those opting to repay the debt contingent on their future 
incomes receive interest rate subsidies equal to the real rate of interest for each year 
the debt remains unpaid. A consequence is that students who take the pay-later option 
will receive greater subsidies the longer repayment takes (that is, the lower their 
future incomes) to repay the debt
14.  
 
When HECS was introduced the repayment parameters were more generous for 
students than those currently in place
15.  The 1992/93 and 1998/99 thresholds and 
                                                            
14  The extent of the subsidy is analysed in Edwards (1988) and Chapman and Salvage (1997). 
15 For example, the first threshold of repayment was equivalent to average earnings, or around $35,000 
per year in 2003 dollars.  
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repayment rates are shown in Figure 1, and should be interpreted as follows.  The 
lines show the percentage of a former student’s annual income deducted to repay an 
HECS obligation, with the top and bottom lines applying respectively to the 
parameters for 1998/99 and 1992/93 respectively.  
 
It is clear from the Figure that the changes introduced to HECS after 1997 were very 
significant. As examples, in 1999 the first income threshold of repayment was 
$21,334 per annum, or about 65 per cent of Australian average weekly earnings. But 
in 1993 this threshold was around $31,000. As another example, if a former student 
earned $40,000 per year, they repaid 3 per cent of income ($1,200) in 1993, but this 
had doubled by 1999.  
 
Figure 1 


















The importance of the threshold changes in 1997 requires some emphasis with respect 
to our empirical exercises. A major point is that for those choosing to repay the charge 
through the tax system, a decrease in the repayment thresholds must mean an increase 
in the present value of the debt because, once incurred, the charge has an interest rate 
which is zero in real terms. Thus if graduates are compelled to repay the charge earlier 
as a result of lower thresholds, this must mean a reduction in the extent of government 
subsidies. Chapman and Salvage (1997) suggest that from the threshold changes alone 
in 1997, the present value of typical HECS debt increased by around 10-15 per cent. 
 
3 (d) Aggregate HECS Effects: Internal Rates of Return  
 
An indirect way to approach the question of the possible effect of HECS on access to 
higher education is through the estimation of changes in aggregate internal rates of 
return to the investment. In the absence of indirect behavioural effects, such as 
associated changes in the relative supply of graduates, rates of return will necessarily 
fall with the imposition of a charge. In the HECS case this is the result of decreases in 


















The estimates now presented are based on data from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 1997 Household and Income Distribution Survey. This is a large (around 
30,000 households) random survey with unit record data cross-sectional information 
on the income, sex, age and educational qualifications of the sample. It is ideal for the 
purpose at hand. 
 
It is possible and instructive to illustrate the effect of these charge levels and 
repayment parameters on the after-tax incomes of graduates by age
16. In what follows 
the 1993  and 1999 HECS repayment parameters have been applied for male and 
female students. We impose the following assumptions: they begin a four year 
Science degree at age 18, graduating at age 22; and, after graduation they take a full-
time job earning the average income by age of graduates of their sex. The age-
earnings profiles have been constructed with the use of simple Mincer earnings 
functions for each sex, including level of education and with a concave treatment for 
experience, as approximated by the difference between age and the assumed age of 
leaving education. The results are standard for this type of exercise with the smoothed 
data shown in Appendix A. 
 
The data allow an illustration of typical HECS repayments for the period between 
1989 and 1997 and for post-1997
17.  Further, in combination with the earnings 
experience of individuals without a university education – to approximate earnings 
foregone whilst attending university – there is sufficient information available to 
calculate the internal rates of return to university education for the two periods of 
different HECS arrangements. The estimates are presented in Table 2. 
 
The results suggest the following. First, in all periods and for both males and females, 
the after-tax rates of return are very healthy, and never below 12.5 per cent. Second, 
the introduction of HECS had a clear but very low impact on rates of return to higher 
education for males, of less than a percentage point. Third, there was a very small 
effect on the return to a university education for females. And four, there was another 
small effect on rates of return for both males and females after the significant changes 
to HECS after 1997, of about an additional 0.8 of a percentage point. 
 
Table 2 















1988 (No HECS)   14.6  13.9  
1993/94  13.8 -0.8 13.4 -0.5 
1997/98   13.1 -1.5 12.6 -1.3 
                                                            
16  Bruce Chapman and Tony Salvage prepared the estimates for this paper. 
17 The earnings information suggests the following. Male Science graduates earning average graduate 
full time incomes will repay their 1999 HECS debt in about 8 or 9 years. Equivalently qualified 





Overall, these calculations suggest that neither the introduction of, nor radical changes 
to, HECS have had major effects on the average financial attractiveness of a 
university education, which remains high. It would be reasonable to conclude from 
this that, in aggregate, it is unlikely that HECS has had an important effect on the 
demand for higher education. However, this does not mean that the policy changes 
had no effect on the financial attractiveness of higher education for particular groups, 
an issue to which we now turn. 
 
 
4  HECS Access Effects: The Literature and a New Approach 
 
4 (a) Introduction  
 
This section contains a summary of the previous literature concerning the effect of 
HECS on the social composition of participants in higher education in Australia.  We 
then describe the data on three cohorts of young Australians we use to analyse 
university participation and the methods we adopt.  Members of the first cohort 
completed their schooling prior to the introduction of HECS, the second when HECS 
operated with close to its original parameters and the third after it was changed 
substantially from 1997.   
 
4 (b) Previous Estimates 
 
As in other countries, both actual and intended university participation in Australia is 
higher among individuals from more advantaged backgrounds than those from 
disadvantaged ones (see Birrell, Calderon, Dobson, and Smith (2000), and James 
(2002), for example).  Our interest is whether the introduction and amendment of 
HECS had any impact of the nature of the relationship between wealth or 
socioeconomic status and university participation.  Therefore, the focus is not on the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and university participation at any point in 
time, but rather on whether the relationship has changed over time. 
 
Australian studies have used two approaches to assess the impact of HECS on 
participation in higher education among low socioeconomic status groups.  The first 
has been to ask people about the factors that shape their decisions to participate in 
higher education.  These studies suggest that HECS has not been a dominant factor 
influencing individual decision-making, either in aggregate or for low socioeconomic 
status groups (Higher Education Council (1992), Robertson, Sloan and Bardsley 
(1990), and Ramsay, Tranter, Charlton and Sumner (1998)).  
 
The second approach has been to test whether participation behaviour among low 
socioeconomic status groups changed in a way that was different from other groups 
after either the introduction of HECS or the changes to the scheme introduced from 
1997.   
 
One example is Andrews (1999), who traced the share of low socioeconomic status 
students among 17 to 24 year olds who commenced higher education from 1989 to 
1998, including their share of disciplines included in the high cost Band 3 introduced 
in 1997.  Individuals were assigned the socioeconomic status score of the region  
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where they or their family lived, based on the postcode of their home address.
18  
Individuals from low socioeconomic status backgrounds were defined as those whose 
home postal address was in the lowest quartile of the population, as determined by the 
value of the relevant socioeconomic status index.   Andrews found that neither the 
introduction of higher and differential HECS nor the lowering of the income 
repayment threshold after 1997 affected the share of low socioeconomic status 
individuals among total higher education students.
19  
 
The major uncertainty about Andrews’ analysis relates to the attribution to individuals 
of the average socioeconomic status level of the postcode of their home address as 
their socioeconomic status background.  Western, McMillan, and Durrington (1998) 
presents results based on a survey of 3000 university students in Queensland that 
suggest such an approach is not reliable.  They found that the correlations between 
individually based socioeconomic status measures and the same postcode based index 
used by Andrews were quite low.
20   
 
The main implication of the Western et al (1998) assessment for the current paper is 
that it would be better to attempt to assess the impact of the introduction of HECS on 
the social composition of the university student body by using individually based 
measures of socioeconomic status.
21 Other studies have utilised individually based 
socioeconomic status measures in analysis of Australian higher education 
participation.  Long, Carpenter, and Hayden (1999) and Marks, Fleming, Long and 
McMillan (2000) used four and five panels of longitudinal data
22 respectively to 
identify how education participation changed in Australia over the 1980s to the late 
1990s.  Long et al used parental education and occupation to identify differences in 
education participation by socioeconomic status, as well as an indirect wealth index 
constructed from responses by individuals to questions about the presence of material 
possessions in their houses.
23     
 
Long  et al (1999) analysed participation in higher education by age 19, for two 
reasons.  The first is that in Australia many school leavers defer university entrance 
for a year.  The second is that their data are drawn from cohorts of individuals of the 
same age.  Since the structure of schooling varies across Australian states, many 
                                                            
18 The index used by Andrews was constructed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.   
19 Andrews (1999) also analysed attitudes to debt by individuals in different socioeconomic status 
groups.  Andrews concluded that observed patterns in Australia did not show any variation by 
socioeconomic status.  Consequently, he argued there should be little or no aversion to acquiring HECS 
debt by low socioeconomic status groups. 
20 Among students aged less than 25, the highest correlation between the postcode-based index and any 
individual measure was 0.271 (with ‘Father’s occupational status’).  The correlations were particularly 
low for individuals whose home address was in a rural or remote region. 
21 There also seems to be some level of ‘official’ acceptance of the value of individually based 
measures of socioeconomic status.  The Australian Department of Education, Science and Technology 
commissioned Jones (2002) to provide advice on how to implement the Western et al. (1998) 
recommendations that parental education and occupation be collected from individuals for inclusion in 
the student administrative collections. 
22 Long et al (1999) analysed panels from the Youth in Transition Survey collected by the Australian 
Council for Educational Research.  The additional panel used by Marks et al. (2000) is a school grade 
based panel of students who were in Year 9 in 1995.  This panel is the 1995 cohort from the 
Longitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth programme. 
23 Individuals were asked about the number of telephones, dishwashers, bedrooms and bathrooms in 
their home when they were at school.  Long et al. developed wealth scales based on these responses 
and compared participation in higher education by wealth quartile.  
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individuals would not have had the opportunity to attend university until the year they 
were aged 19 in the data used.  Long et al analysed data for individuals aged 19 in 
1980, 1984, 1989 and 1994, interpreting loosely their third and fourth cohorts as pre- 
and post-HECS introduction cohorts.  
 
Long  et al found that wealth has a strong positive effect on higher education 
participation.  In addition, they found that differences between socioeconomic status 
groups widened somewhat in the last cohort compared to the third cohort.  However, 
they acknowledged that such a trend was evident in the earlier cohorts, so that it may 
not have been a specific HECS-related effect.   
 
Chapman (1997) analysed university participation among 18 year olds in the last two 
cohorts analysed by Long et al (1999) and concluded that the introduction of HECS 
had not affected university participation by students from disadvantaged backgrounds.  
Chapman’s approach had the advantage of measuring university participation in 1988 
for the third cohort, prior to the introduction of HECS.  However, not everyone aged 
eighteen in these data had completed school when surveyed in the relevant years, so 
the estimates understated university participation among young Australians.  
 
The measure of participation used by Marks et al (2000) for the additional cohort they 
analysed differed from that used for the earlier cohorts by Long et al (1999).  It was 
the proportion of individuals in higher education in 1999 that had been in the Year 9 
in 1995.  The wealth measure used by Marks et al (2000) for the last panel also 
differed from the earlier ones.
24 This research confirmed the positive impact of wealth 
on higher education participation.  However, in general, their results suggested that 
socioeconomic status was less important in determining higher education participation 
in the 1999 data than had been the case in the earlier panels. 
 
Marks and Evans (2003) analyse university participation within ranges of the entrance 
scores used by universities to select students for undergraduate courses in 1999.  They 
find that within these entrance score ranges, individuals whose parental occupational 
backgrounds are ‘blue’ collar are as likely to participate in university as those whose 
parental occupational backgrounds was professional.  They conclude that since 
occupational origins have little influence on university participation once entrance 
scores are taken into account, HECS has not deterred students from less privileged 
backgrounds from attending university. 
 
4 (c) The Data  
  
Our analysis of the access effects of HECS utilises three of the longitudinal panels of 
data used in the Long et al (1999) and Marks et al (2000) studies. One of our 
contributions is to use a consistent definition of university participation across these 
three cohorts.  In addition, our approach allows clearer tests of the potential role of 
policy change given the focus on the three distinct phases of HECS. 
 
We analyse the participation in higher education of 18 year olds in the first year they 
could potentially attend university.  This means that for the first two cohorts we 
estimate the participation in higher education in 1988 and 1993 of individuals who, in 
                                                            
24 Individuals responded yes or no (rather than the number) to questions about whether their house 
contained a dishwasher, computer, piano and swimming pool, among other items.  
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the first year the cohort was surveyed, were in a grade cohort such that they should 
have reached Year 12 in 1987 and 1992 respectively.
25, 26 For the 1999 cohort 
analysed in Marks et al (2000), we limit our analysis to higher education participation 
among 18 year olds in 1999. 
 
One problem with our approach is that it relies on progression rates through school to 
university being similar in 1988, 1993 and 1999.  These may well vary over time, if 
either repetition of school grades or deferment rates for the first year of university 
vary between cohorts.  Such variations may affect our assessment of the social 
composition of the university student body if grade repetition or university deferral 
rates are themselves associated with socioeconomic status.  In the discussion of our 
results, we assess their fragility in the face of such varying progression rates, 
especially high year 12 repetition rates that affect our results for the 1993 cohort. 
 
We use a similar measure of wealth to that adopted by Long et al (1999).  That is, an 
indirect wealth index is constructed from responses by individuals to questions about 
the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, telephones and dishwashers in their houses for 
the first two cohorts.
27  For the 1999 cohort, we use the responses to the extended list 
of items (the presence of a dishwasher, colour television, video camera, computer, 
compact disc player, piano, telephone, mobile phone, microwave oven and swimming 
pool) as though it is identical to the earlier measures for the purposes of assigning 
individuals to wealth quartiles.
28  Evidence suggests that the separate wealth measures 
convey similar information about like individuals in the three cohorts.
29  I n  t h e  
analyses undertaken below, the individuals are assigned the value of their rank 
(between zero for the lowest ranked and unity for the highest ranked individual) 
according to the wealth variable for their specific cohort. 
 
In some analyses described below we use a broader measure of individual SES than 
the wealth measure to assess the robustness of our main analyses.  This measure is a 
weighted estimate of parental education and occupation variables, along with the 
wealth index.  The weights were based on probit regression parameters of an equation 
explaining whether individuals completed year 12 or not.  The equation contained the 
                                                            
25 The approach avoids two problems with the Long et al (1999) and Marks et al (2000) studies. The 
age-based nature of their initial cohorts means that the observations were spread over three school 
grades, so the participation rate by age 19 includes individuals who potentially could have been at 
university for one, two or three years.  Second, the 1989 cohort analysed in Long et al (1999) includes 
some individuals who commenced university after the introduction of HECS, invalidating any pre- and 
post- HECS implementation comparison between the 1989 and 1994 cohorts.   
26 Given the structure of schooling in Australian states, this lowers the contribution of students from 
New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory in all cohorts for our 
estimates below their true importance in the population.   
27 Individuals also indicated whether their family owned a boat or a holiday house.  Alternative wealth 
measures that included these responses provided qualitatively similar results to those we present below. 
28 For all cohorts, the wealth scale is based on the first principal component of the responses to the 
questions about the material possessions.  Other regression-based approaches to constructing the wealth 
rank indicated that the available variables influenced education participation (school completion and 
intentions to attend university), but that use of alternative scales did not lead to qualitatively different 
results to those we present below.  
29 For example, the mean values of the (standard normally distributed) wealth scale for individuals who 
attended an independent, private school in the three cohorts were: 0.686, 0.650 and 0.617.  The values 
for those who attended Catholic schools were: 0.305, 0.301 and 0.215; and for those who attended 
government schools:  -0.157, -0.148 and -0.213.  The averages across cohorts are obviously similar, 
while at the same time reflecting the drift from government to private schools in Australia.   
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full set of variables that appear in Table A.3 of Appendix A.  Once more, individuals 
were assigned their rank for the broader SES variable for the purposes of analysis.  
This broader measure can be interpreted as providing a SES measure that includes 
both financial and cultural elements that might influence university participation.    
 
The first two cohorts of data we use were each of over 5000 individuals who were 
followed from about age 15 until their mid-twenties.  The data contain detailed 
information about the family backgrounds of individuals, their schooling and 
subsequent activities (post-school education and labour market involvement).  Similar 
data have been collected from the third cohort, which involved a sample of over 
13000 Year 9 school students.   
 
Individuals in the first two cohorts were surveyed by mail after an initial survey 
completed in their classroom, while participants in the third were interviewed by 
telephone after initial school-based contact and mail surveys.  The series are described 
in more detail in ACER (1997).  After we restrict analysis of the first two cohorts to 
those in the grade cohorts such that they should have reached Year 12 in 1987 and 
1992 respectively, we utilise 1206 and 2245 observations respectively from those 
samples.
30  For the 1999 cohort, our analysis of 18 year olds only in 1999 means that 
we utilise 4856 observations.   
 
The sample sizes and university participation rates by gender in each of the cohorts 
are presented in Table 3.  The participation rates are higher after 1988, reflecting the 
expansion of the Australian higher education system after the late 1980s.  Growth in 
university participation was much more pronounced for females than males.   
 
 
     
Table 3 
Number of Observations and University Participation Rates: 1988, 1993 and 
1999 
 
 Males  Females  Persons 
Number of Observations       
1988    533    673  1206 
1993     913  1332  2245 
1999 2099  2757  4856 
      
University Participation Rate       
1988 27.3  22.1  24.4 
1993 28.7  30.9  29.9 
1999 33.2  41.6  38.0 






                                                            
30 Attrition also affects the number of observations available for analysis.  
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4 (d) Methodology  
 
Our interest is in whether and how the relationship between university participation  
or student intentions to attend, denoted by p, and individual wealth or socioeconomic 
status, denoted by s, have changed with the introduction of HECS.  That is, we are 
interested in testing whether the form of the relationship  
 
(1)   pt = ft(st) 
 
changed over time.  We address this issue through both non-parametric and 
parametric approaches.  First, we estimate the shape the f relationship for the three 
cohorts of young people.  Specifically, we estimate for each cohort the expected value 
of university participation at each value of the wealth or socioeconomic ranking, 
E(p|s).  This is essentially a way of describing the data and is undertaken using kernel 
regression techniques (see Chapter 3 of Pagan and Ullah (1999) for a description of 
these techniques).   
 
These conditional mean functions can be graphed to provide a visual impression of 
how the relationship between university participation and individual wealth or SES 
may have changed over time.  In addition, since they show how the proportion that 
participated at university varied by wealth or SES level, these functions can also be 
used to estimate ‘Lorenz’ curves of how concentrated the distribution of higher 
education participation is with wealth or SES.  Inequality measures based on these 
‘Lorenz’ curves, such as Gini coefficients can be used to assess whether the 
distribution has become more or less equal over time (see Cowell 2000 for a 
description of these measures and Barrett et al. 2000 for a recent application of these 
measures that uses Australian consumption and income data). 
 
Our second approach to identifying changes in the relationship between university 
participation and individual wealth or SES is parametric.  We assume that 
participation at university for individual i individual at time t can be described by 
 
(2)   pit
*
   = β β β βt′Xit + εit,   εit ∼ N(0,1), and 
 
pit = 1  if pit
*
  > 0    and     pit = 0   if pit
*




 is an unobserved variable reflecting an individual’s eligibility, application 
and receipt of a university offer by a particular time, t, and pit  is the realisation of that 
entire process.  The Xit are a set of explanatory variables and β β β βt is a parameter vector, 
with the parameter associated with each explanatory variable allowed to vary over 
time.  A different set of individuals, i, are observed at each time period.   
 
These assumptions involve estimation of the parameters of the model via probit 
estimation, where  
 
(3) Pr  (pit = 1) =  Φ(β β β βt′Xit)  
 




In the results for the simple model reported here, X, has three main elements.  The 
first is a constant that is allowed to vary by cohort, which will pick up the expansion 
of the Australian higher education system between 1988 and 1999.  The second is the 
representation of the wealth or SES variable, the effect of which is also allowed to 
vary by cohort and is allowed to be non-linear via the inclusion of higher order terms 
or the specification of spline functions.  The third element of X is a gender indicator, 
which is also allowed to vary in its effect by cohort.   
  
Essentially, we treat the wealth variable as summarising all of the financial aspects of 
socioeconomic status that affect participation in higher education, such as family 
capacity and preparedness to finance participation.  We focus on the effect of wealth 
as a descriptor of socioeconomic status because it is a composite measure that 
summarises the social phenomenon we are interested in.  It captures the relevant 
dimension that much of the debate has taken over the composition of the higher 
education student body in Australia.   
 
The additional family background variables in the broader socioeconomic measure 
described in the previous section capture other potential influences on university 
participation.   These family background influences may affect university 
participation through family cultural ‘capital’ and individual preferences for and 
ability to undertake higher education.  This broader measure is used to assess how 
robust our results that use the wealth measure only are to the use of broader measures 





In this section we analyse changes in university participation by using our data to 
address the following questions: 
 
•  Did the relationship between family wealth (or socioeconomic status) and 
university participation change after 1988? 
 
•  Did any such change result in the distribution of university participation across 
wealth groups becoming less equal after 1988? 
 
•  Did the relationship between wealth and student intentions to attend university 
change after 1988? 
 
•  Among a group of ‘marginal’ decision-makers, i.e. those who indicated while 
at school that they did not intend to go to university, did the relationship 
between wealth and university participation change after 1988?, and 
 
•  Was HECS the cause of any measured change in these relationships? 
 







5 (a) Wealth and University Participation 
    
We begin our analysis of university participation by wealth background by looking at 
the kernel estimates of the proportion of each wealth level that participated at 
university.  These estimates are shown in Figures 3 through 5 for persons, males and 
females respectively.  In all three figures, the lines represent the estimated proportion 
of 18 year olds by wealth enrolled at university in 1988, 1993 and 1999.  These 
capture periods immediately before the introduction of HECS, when it operated with 
parameters close to those originally implemented and after the substantial changes 
introduced from 1997.   
 
The Figures capture collectively a number of well-known features of the Australian 
higher education sector over the 1990s: the expansion of the system, with the 1999 
participation proportions typically lying well above the 1988 ones at all wealth levels; 
and the increased relative participation of females, with the gap between the 1988 and 
1993 and 1993 and 1999 curves much greater for females than males. 
 
What is also clear from Figure 5 is that the change in female participation varied by 
wealth level, with the increase in participation more pronounced at middle levels of 
the wealth distribution than at either the top or bottom of the distribution.  For males, 
the picture is less clear.  While participation was generally higher in 1999 than 1988, 
it was lower over a number of wealth ranges in 1993 than it had been in 1988, 
especially in the lower half of the distribution.  At the very bottom of the wealth 
range, participation may have been lower for males in 1999 than 1988, but the kernel 
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Finally, the Figures are consistent with some change in the relationship between 
university participation and wealth over the period.  Visually, the 1999 female curve 
in Figure 5 is steeper than the 1988 one, at least up to about the 75
th wealth percentile.  
This change reflects the growth in participation from the middle of the wealth  
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distribution described earlier.  Some modest steepening of the relationship for males 
is also apparent from Figure 4.
 31   
 
We now turn to the parametric estimation of the relationship between university 
participation and wealth and whether that relationship changed after 1988.  The 
Figures just described would lead us to anticipate that we should find some change – 
most notably that we would expect to the relationship after 1988 to reflect the faster 
growth in participation that occurred in the middle of the wealth distribution.    
 
The results from the simple probit estimation of equation (3) are summarised in Table 
4.   The specifications originally estimated included (alternatively) higher order 
wealth terms and spline functions of the wealth variables in all years.  The results 
presented in the Table are based on a final specification from which insignificant 
wealth-related variables were excluded.  Essentially, the results indicate that linear 
terms in wealth capture the relationship between wealth and university participation 
satisfactorily in 1988 and 1993, but not in 1999 for females and persons. 
 
A number of features of the results summarised in Table 4 are of note.  First, 
participation increased with higher levels of wealth for persons, males and females in 
1988.  The parameter on the wealth variable in 1988 is positive and significant in all 
equations and corresponds to a difference in participation between the top and bottom 
of the wealth distribution of about 15 percentage points.   
 
Second, the growth in participation in the middle of the wealth distribution by 1999 
for persons and females was particularly marked.  This is reflected in the 1999 
quadratic wealth term in the relevant equations.  The results suggest that participation 
among females grew more up to about the 70
th percentile between 1988 and 1999 than 
it did at higher wealth levels.   
 
                                                            
31 All of the features described above were evident when the broader measure of SES was used instead 





Modelling the Proportion of University-eligible 18 years Enrolled:  
1988, 1993 and 1999 
 
  Persons Males Females 






Constant  -0.935  -11.155 -0.924  -12.858 -1.110 -9.366 
1993  -0.054  -0.519 0.021 0.279 0.073 0.511 
1999  0.091 0.896 0.155 2.346 0.300 2.139 
Wealth  rank  0.476 3.364 0.656 8.407 0.640 3.352 
Wealth rank by 1993  0.423  2.429     0.413 1.768 
Wealth rank by 1999  1.120  3.767     1.196 3.055 
Wealth rank squared - 1999  -0.806  -3.208    -0.995  -3.020 
        
Implied wealth effect of a move from the bottom to the top of the wealth distribution 
on the probability of university participation 
        






1988  0.148 3.404 0.217 8.301 0.186 3.443 
1993  0.303 9.303 0.219 8.503 0.356 8.370 
1999  0.279  12.426 0.234 8.638 0.303  10.114 
Change  between  periods        
1988  to  1993  0.155 2.845 0.003 0.278 0.171 2.485 
1993  to  1999  -0.024 -0.596  0.015  2.347 -0.053 -1.021 
1988  to  1999  0.131 2.676 0.017 2.137 0.118 1.906 
 (a) Derived from results in Table A.1. 
 
Third, for males, the 1993 and 1999 wealth-year interaction variables are not 
significant, which suggest that there was no change in the relationship between wealth 
and university participation after 1988 for males.  The 1993 year indicator variable 
was not significant in the male equation, while the 1999 one was.  Taken together, 
however, the results suggest that male participation changed very little between 1988 
and 1999.  
 
Finally, and as a consequence of the previous points, there was a marked shift in 
participation patterns between the genders.  In 1988, a higher proportion of males 
participated in university than females.  By 1999, the reverse was true.  This relative 
growth in participation among females took place across the entire wealth 
distribution.
32, 33, 34   
                                                            
32 Decomposition of this changed participation differential suggest that the incorporation of nurse and 
teacher education into the higher education system in Australia in the late 1980s made only modest 
contributions to the total effect reported here.   Neither did different patterns of school completion 
between girls and boys.   The major contributing factor was that girls were increasingly more likely to 
continue to university after completing school. 
33 These findings carried over to results where the broader SES variable was included.  With that 




5(b) Equality of the Distribution of University Participation 
 
Figures 3 through 5 show how the proportion that participated at university varied by 
wealth level in 1988, 1993 and 1999.  These estimates can also be used to analyse 
changes in the distribution of higher education participation by wealth, using 
analytical tools from the income ‘inequality’ literature.  These include ‘Lorenz’ 
curves, Gini coefficients and other inequality measures that can be used to assess 
whether the distribution has become more or less equal over time. 
 
Figure 6 contains the ‘persons’ Lorenz curves for university participation for 1988, 
1993 and 1999.  These Lorenz curves show the cumulative share of university 
attendance going to the least wealthy specified proportion of the population.  More 
unequal distributions lie further away from the ‘complete equality’ 45
0 line.  Gini 
coefficients reflect the area between Lorenz curves and the 45
0 line.  Therefore, larger 
Gini coefficients also reflect more unequal distributions.   
 
The three Lorenz curves in Figure 6 are broadly similar.  In general, the 1993 curve 
appears to lie further away from the 45
0 line than the curves for the other two years.  
This suggests that the distribution of university participation may have been less equal 
in 1993 than 1988, but not in 1999.  However, all three Lorenz curves in Figure 6 
intersect one another at various points of the wealth distribution.   
 
Unfortunately, when Lorenz curves intersect, Gini coefficients do not provide an 
unambiguous comparison of the degree of inequality in two distributions.  Other 
inequality measures, such as those proposed by Atkinson (1970), must be used in 
those circumstances.  The Atkinson indexes vary according to the aversion to 
inequality they allow.  In this context, this means that larger values of the ‘inequality 
aversion’ parameter place larger social weights on increased participation by 
individuals at the lowest end of the wealth distribution.  Therefore, we report a range 
of inequality measures for the ‘persons’ distributions in Table 5.  For all of the 
inequality measures in Table 5, an increase in the measure between cohorts indicates 
that inequality increased. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with the wealth-based measure, but once more the growth in participation to 1999 was strongest in the 
middle sections of the distribution. These results appear in Table A.2 of Appendix A. 
34 When the equation includes individual characteristics as additional regressors, the estimates suggest 
the relationship between wealth and university participation was different in 1993 from what it was in 
1988, but not in 1999.  These results appear in Table A.3 of Appendix A and may reflect problems with 
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Inequality Indexes of University Participation: 1988, 1993 and 1999 
 
  1988 1993 1999 
Inequality Index  Persons 
    
Gini  coefficient  0.150 0.176 0.121 
Atkinson index – inequality aversion 







    =    1.0  0.034  0.049  0.027 
    =    2.0  0.065  0.096  0.057 
90/10  percentile  ratio  2.161 2.267 1.980 
90/50  percentile  ratio  1.575 1.471 1.189 
50/10 percentile ratio  1.372 1.541 1.664 
75/25  percentile  ratio  1.409 1.985 1.355 
75/50  percentile  ratio  1.174 1.392 1.146 
50/25  percentile  ratio  1.200 1.427 1.182 
 
 
The inequality measures presented in Table 5 confirm a number of points already 
made.  First, the distribution of university participation by wealth may have been 
more unequal in 1993 than 1988, but this was not permanent.  Most of the inequality 
measures were lower by 1999 than they had been in 1988.  Second, the growth in 
university participation between 1988 and 1999 was concentrated in the middle of the  
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wealth distribution – the 90/10 percentile ratio did not change while the 90/50-
percentile ratio fell and the 50/10 percentile ratio increased.  That is, participation in 




Taken together, these various inequality measures suggest that there may have been 
some change in the relationship between university participation and wealth after 
1988.  It was more unequally distributed in 1993 than it was in 1988.  However, that 
apparent change did not persist, and by 1999 the distribution was no less equally 
distributed than it had been prior to the introduction of HECS.  In fact, there are 
reasons to doubt the magnitude of the apparent increase in inequality in the 1993 
distribution.   
 
The early 1990s coincided with a sharp increase in repetition of the last year of school 
in Australia (Morgan 1996).  The exact reasons behind this increase are unclear, but 
appear to have been related in part to students attempting to improve their university 
entrance rankings, which determine both their eligibility for entrance and the specific 









  Year 12  Repetition Rate  University Deferral Rate  
  Male  Female Male Female 
1988  0.6  1.0 3.6 5.3 
1993  7.6  5.0 3.1 5.6 
1999  3.3  2.6 3.5 4.2 
(a) See footnotes 39 and 40 for definitions of these rates.  
 
With our approach to measuring participation at age 18, this means there was a 
substantial group in 1993 in the denominator who had not left school.  Moreover, this 
repetition also had a social dimension.  It was more concentrated among individuals 
from the lower end of the wealth distribution in 1993 than it had been in 1988.   
 
In addition, deferral of university commencement by one year also has a social 
dimension – deferral rates are positively associated with wealth.
37  However, the 
relationship was slightly less strong in 1993 and 1999 than it had been in 1988. 
 
                                                            
35 The same patterns are evident when participation is analysed using the broad SES measure.  The 
broad measure indicates university participation is more unequally distributed than the wealth measure.  
This is to be expected, since it is based on a weighted average of background factors estimated to affect 
educational attainment and is, therefore, more likely to capture differences in participation than any one 
of its constituent elements. 
36 The Year 12 repetition rate for year x shows the proportion of the total cohort who were Year 12 in 
both year x and year x – 1.   
37 The university deferral rate for year x shows the proportion of the total cohort who were Year 12 in 
year x – 1 (but not year x) and who were at university in year x + 1, but not year x.    
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Adjustment of the empirical proportion participating in university suggests that the 
‘true’ curves in Figure 3 for 1988 should be somewhat steeper and the 1993 and 1999 
curves flatter.
38  The consequent inequality measures for 1988 all suggest greater 
inequality than the measures in Table 3, while those for 1993 and 1999 are lower.  For 
example, the Gini coefficients for 1988, 1993 and 1999 of 0.150, 0.176 and 0.121 
change to 0.158, 0.167 and 0.115 respectively.  Consequently, our view is that the 
apparent worsening in the equality of the distribution of university participation in 
1993 is overstated in the data we use.
39   
 
5 (c) Wealth and Student Intentions  
   
Individuals in each of the cohorts we analyse were asked at age fourteen or fifteen 
what they intended to do when they left school, including whether they intended to go 
to university.  Such plans to attend to university will reflect a host of factors that also 
determine actual participation in university – wealth, family and individual attitudes 
to higher education, family preparedness to finance study and individual ability.  In 
particular, it seems likely that family ‘cultural’ capital and values may impact 
substantially on individual answers to such questions. 
 
The likelihood that individuals answered that they planned to go to university is 
presented in Figure 7 and shows a similar wealth profile to actual participation – it 
was highest among those in the highest wealth groups in the 1988 cohort.  The 1993 
and 1999 cohorts reported their intentions in 1989 and 1995 respectively.  Hence, they 
both reflect student intentions reported prior to the 1997 HECS changes.   
 
What is notable in Figure 7 is that reported university enrolment intentions changed 
very little between the 1988 and 1999 cohorts for the lowest and highest wealth 
groups.  These proportions even fell marginally in the 1993 cohort, who reported 
them in 1989, which may represent some kind of initial HECS announcement or 
implementation effect.  However, the growth in those indicating they intended to go 
to university was substantial in the middle of the wealth distribution (about 20 
percentage points).  Earlier analyses indicate that it was this group whose actual 
university participation increased the most between 1988 and 1999.  For the middle of 
the wealth distribution, the growth in university participation appears to have been 
driven by growth in educational aspirations, which the introduction of HECS did 
nothing to dampen.  At the extremes of the wealth distribution, study aspirations 
changed very little.  It seems more likely that social forces were at work in generating 
these changed relative aspirations between these groups than that the introduction of 
HECS affected the aspirations of both rich and poor over the period but not those of 
the middle of the distribution.  
 
                                                            
38 The adjustment involved:  
adjusted participation rate = (measured rate + University deferral rate)/(1- Year 12 repetition rate). 
39 The results in Long et al (1999) support this.  Recall that they analyse university participation one 
year later, at age nineteen.  They find a substantial increase in participation between the 1989 and 1994 
cohorts, with little difference between the increase in participation of the lowest wealth quartile and 
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In the last cohort, individuals were asked in each year from 1995 to 1998 what they 
intended to do when they left school.  This makes it possible to identify any 
announcement effect on university study intentions from the 1997 changes to HECS.  
These changes were announced as part of the Australian Government 1996-97 Budget 
in August 1996.  The data on intentions were collected by mail from individuals in 
December of that year.  The proportion of the lowest, middle two and highest wealth 
quartiles who indicated that they intended to go to university in each year from 1995 
to 1998 is shown in Figure 8, along with the actual university participation in 1999. 
 
Figure 8 has a number of noteworthy features. First, there is apparently a pronounced 
‘announcement’ effect in 1996 associated with the 1997 changes to HECS.  Second, 
that effect is evident for all wealth groups, though it appears least strong for the low 
wealth group.
40  Third, the announcement effect was temporary, with the proportion 
indicating they intended to go to university rebounding in the following year for all 
wealth groups.  Fourth, far fewer individuals attend university than plan to, even 
among those who plan to do so in Year 12.    
 
                                                            
40 The change in the proportion intending to go to university between 1995 and 1996 was significant at 
the 5 per cent level in aggregate and for all groups except the low wealth group, for whom it was 
significant at the 10 per cent level.  The rebound between 1996 and 1997 was also significant at the 5 
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5 (d) Participation Among a Group of ‘Marginal’ Decision-makers 
 
The analysis of the entire grade cohorts described above may mask the effect of 
HECS on groups whose decisions to attend university might be particularly fragile in 
the face of such changes.  One such group are individuals who, at least during their 
secondary school, showed no strong preferences towards attending university after 
they completed their schooling. 
 
Since intentions do not necessarily translate into action, we now analyse the 
proportion of individuals who indicated that they did not plan to go to university, but 
who subsequently did.  We view these individuals as able students who did not have 
strong preferences towards higher education.  We are interested in whether there is 
any obvious wealth effect on participation among such individuals and whether it 
differed in the earliest cohort from that apparent in the later cohorts.  Specifically, if 
HECS acted as a deterrent to bright students whose school performance led them to 
attend university when they had not planned to, it might have affected the low 
socioeconomic status group more than the higher socioeconomic status groups.   
 
Therefore, we now analyse university participation only among the group who 
indicated that they did not plan to attend university.  When analysed this way, there is 
no evidence of any wealth effect on university participation in any of the cohorts for 
persons.  The probit regression results are summarised in Table A.4 for both genders 
and Figure 9 for persons.  However, the pattern is somewhat different between males 
and females.  Among this group in 1988, participation was positively associated with 
wealth for girls, but negatively associated for boys.  In 1993 and 1999, there was no 
significant wealth effect on participation for either gender.  Figure 9, however, does 
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the higher education system.  The results lead us to conclude that HECS did not act to 
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Additional information is available to us about the behaviour of individuals in the 
middle cohort, the one whose participants commenced their courses after the 
introduction of HECS.  For that cohort, individuals were asked whether they applied 
to go to university, received an offer of a place, accepted it and actually eventually 
commenced the course.  The proportion of individuals who did not plan to go to 
university but applied to go and eventually commenced a university course was 
similar across the wealth distribution at about 0.35.
41   
 
 
5 (e) University Access of the Disadvantaged in the Absence of HECS  
 
The analysis in the preceding sub-sections compares the social composition of 
university participation before HECS operated in 1988 with that of 1993 and 1999.  
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the same as analysing the social composition in 
1993 and 1999 with and without HECS.  In this sub-section, we address how much 
the absence of a ‘true’ counter-factual comparison diminishes our confidence about 
what the results suggest the impact of HECS was on the social composition of 
university participation. 
 
                                                            
41 The proportions for the lowest wealth quartile, the middle two quartiles and the highest quartiles 
were 0.33, 0.36 and 0.38 respectively.  The differences in these proportions were not significant.  
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Our analysis of changes in higher education participation suggests that the social 
composition of participants in Australian higher education was different in 1999 from 
1988.  Participation growth was strongest in the middle of the wealth distributions and 
more pronounced among females than males.  While participation has grown 
somewhat less at the lower end of the wealth distribution than in the middle, the same 
is true of the higher end of the distribution.  If anything, the distribution of higher 
education participation across the wealth distribution appeared to become more equal.  
For those who changed their mind about university participation, there was no 
evidence that low wealth individuals were any more discouraged from attending 
university in 1999 than they had been in 1988.  Therefore, our conclusion is that those 
from less privileged backgrounds were no more discouraged from attending university 
in 1999 than they had been in 1988. 
 
Do these conclusions alone tell us anything about the impact of HECS?  After all, 
other economic and social forces not observed by us may have influenced the 
estimated relationship between wealth and university participation in 1993 and 1999 
and may have masked the ‘true’ discouragement effect of HECS.  An example of such 
a factor might the strength of the labour market, which might influence the relative 
availability of full-time employment for individuals from low wealth backgrounds. 
 
If such forces existed, and HECS discouraged access by the poor, their effect must 
have been to increase university participation at the lower end of the wealth 
distribution.  It seems reasonable to expect that such forces might affect participation 
in other forms of education in a similar manner. Therefore, some idea about the 
possible existence of such forces on education participation might be gleaned by 
looking at Year 12 completion by wealth over the same period.   
 
The data exhibit the same pattern of Year 12 completion over the period as university 
participation.  School completion increased most in the middle range of the wealth 
distribution, with the increase slightly less at the bottom of the distribution than it was 
at the top.  If broad social and economic forces operated to mask the negative impact 
of HECS on university participation at the lower end of the wealth distribution, the 
same forces did not act to push up school completion among that same group relative 
to other groups.    
 
A second approach to looking at the impact of HECS on the social composition of 
university participation is to analyse participation among the grade cohort that 
followed the 1988 cohort already used here.  That grade cohort completed school in 
1988 and its members were able to commence university in 1989.  The data set 
contains observations on around 250 individuals from that grade cohort.   
 
With a gap of just one year, it seems more reasonable to assume that broader social 
and economic factors might have little impact on the relative social composition of 
the university student body in the two periods.  The major change affecting the 
student body between 1988 and 1989 was clearly the introduction of the HECS 
scheme. 
 
When we replicate the probit regression analysis of Table 4 for the 1988/1989 
cohorts, neither a 1989 year identifier nor specific wealth effect for that year were 
significant.  The results are reported in Table A.5 of Appendix A.  While we would  
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prefer to have more observations from 1989 to rely on, there is no evidence from 
these data that the social composition of university participation changed between two 
years where the main factor that might have induced such a change was the 
introduction of HECS.





We have found that the socioeconomic composition of the higher education student 
body changed somewhat between 1988 and 1993 in Australia, with the main change 
being the relative increase in participation by individuals in the middle of the wealth 
distribution. In this period the observed change in the distribution and growth in 
participation for ‘persons’ seems to be largely driven by changed university 
participation among females across the entire socioeconomic distribution.  In contrast, 
growth was stagnant for males at the low wealth end of the distribution, very modest 
for those at the top, but more pronounced for those from the middle of the 
distribution.  Nevertheless, the growth achieved by the last group was still lower than 
that achieved by females from the low wealth end of the distribution.   
 
In the period after the modifications to HECS, there are apparently no differences 
between the proportionate increases in the participation of all socioeconomic groups. 
Further, while there was a slight across-the-board decrease in the intentions of 
secondary students concerning university participation, in the next year enrolment 
intentions rebounded to their previous level for all socioeconomic groups. Finally, for 
a particular group, those who had not intended to participate in university, no 
differences associated with socioeconomic background were found in the proportion 
that eventually did participate. 
 
The changes in overall university participation appear to reflect different behaviour 
across genders rather than across socioeconomic groups, with the exception that 
growth was highest among the middle of the wealth distribution.  There are no strong 
grounds for arguing that the introduction of HECS has been a major deterrent for 
individuals from the low wealth group for one gender but not the other.  This suggests 
that the introduction of income contingent charging systems for higher education has 





                                                            
42 Another approach to estimating the impact of the introduction of HECS on the social composition of 
university participants is to follow Andrews (1999) and analyse participation by HECS Band over the 
three cohorts (see Table 1 for the disciplines in each Band).  Charges for courses in Band 3 more than 
doubled from 1997.  Estimates from a probit equation like that reported in Table 4 indicate that the 
relationship between wealth and participation in Band 3 courses in 1993 and 1999 was no different 
from that evident in 1988.  The shares of individuals from the lowest wealth quartile of Band 3 courses 
were 8.1, 11.0 and 8.0 per cent in 1988, 1993 and 1999 respectively.  The changes in these shares 
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University Participation at age 18: Probit Results with Wealth Measures Only 
 
 Persons  Males  Females 






Constant  -0.935  -11.155 -0.924  -12.858 -1.110 -9.366 
1993  -0.054  -0.519 0.021 0.279 0.073 0.511 
1999  0.091 0.896 0.155 2.346 0.300 2.139 
Wealth  rank  0.476 3.364 0.656 8.407 0.640 3.352 
Wealth rank by 1993  0.423  2.429     0.413 1.768 
Wealth rank by 1999  1.120  3.767     1.196 3.055 
Wealth rank squared - 1999  -0.806  -3.208    -0.995  -3.020 
        
Number of observations       8307       3545       4762 
Log likelihood function   -4957.5   -2102.8   -2833.6 
Restricted log likelihood   -5131.1   -2143.7   -2977.0 
Chi-squared   347.1   81.7   286.8 
Significance level   0  0            0 
         
Hosmer-Lemeshow     12.7     8.1     5.5 
P-value        0.12       0.42       0.70 
        
McFadden R
2         0.037          0.025         0.048 
Predictions  (cutoff=0.4)        
%  not  studying  correct   71.0  51.6  64.8 
%  studying  correct   45.7  65.7  57.1 
%  correct   62.5  55.9  62.0 
        
        LR test for inclusion of  1988 and 1993 
quadratic terms  4.6          2.35 
P-value         0.10            0.31 
         
       LR test for inclusion of 1988 and 1993 
wealth and quadratic terms          7.58    
P-value           0.18    





University Participation at age 18: Probit Results with Broad Socioeconomic 
Status Measures  
 
 Persons  Males  Females 






Constant  -0.724 -6.225 -0.453 -2.651 -0.961 -5.907 
1993  -0.504 -3.253 -0.795 -3.274 -0.258 -1.247 
1999  -0.075 -0.576 -0.485 -2.507  0.257  1.436 
Wealth  rank  -1.581 -2.928 -2.346 -2.853 -0.985 -1.350 
Wealth  rank  squared  2.443 4.627 3.089 3.780 1.987 2.833 
Wealth  rank  by  1993  2.447 3.499 3.230 2.943 1.861 2.017 
Wealth  rank  squared  -  1993  -1.740 -2.582 -2.508 -2.373 -1.205 -1.362 
Wealth  rank  by  1999  1.828 3.047 2.376 2.586 1.365 1.694 
Wealth  rank  squared  -  1999  -1.362 -2.325 -1.703 -1.877 -1.082 -1.393 
        
Number of observations       8307       3545        4762 
Log likelihood function   -4850.3   -1980.3    -2717.0 
Restricted log likelihood   -5295.1   -2143.7    -2977.0 
Chi-squared       813.6       326.8       519.9 
Significance level   0  0            0 
         
Hosmer-Lemeshow         31.8    17.0       23.9 
P-value         0.0003          0.030            0.002 
        
McFadden R
2         0.083         0.083         0.088 
Predictions  (cutoff=0.4)        
%  not  studying  correct   76.4  80.7  72.4 
%  studying  correct   51.0  46.5  54.4 
%  correct   67.9  70.2  66.0 





University participation at age 18: Probit Results with Wealth Measures, Gender 
and Personal Background Variables 




Constant -1.934  -24.493  -1.804 -16.684 
1993  0.322 4.446 0.087 0.715 
1999 0.674  10.071  0.555  5.038 
Wealth  rank  0.273 4.605 0.028 0.185 
Wealth rank by 1993     0.444 2.450 
Wealth rank by 1999     0.217 1.327 
Male 1988  0.213  2.62  0.234 2.717 
Male 1993  -0.081  -1.29  -0.077 -1.249 
Male 1999  -0.288  -7.21  -0.310 -7.446 
Father with degree  0.423 7.570 0.420 7.505 
Mother with degree  0.357 5.511 0.358 5.520 
Both parents with degrees  -0.227 -2.319 -0.225 -2.299 
Father's occ -  professional  0.342 7.117 0.347 7.201 
Father's occ -  manager  0.258 6.137 0.259 6.158 
Father's occ - other white collar  0.237 4.609 0.241 4.687 
Metropolitan region  0.031 0.896 0.032 0.911 
Catholic school  0.274 6.832 0.274 6.838 
Independent school  0.448 9.353 0.449 9.363 
Self assessed ability - well above average  1.150 25.512  1.151 25.554 
Self assessed ability - above average  0.667 18.801  0.667 18.793 
Father born o/s, English-speaking  -0.032 -0.607 -0.032 -0.610 
Father born o/s, non-English-speaking  0.368 8.502 0.366 8.469 
VIC  0.106 2.448 0.107 2.483 
QLD  -0.098 -2.079 -0.098 -2.078 
SA  -0.143 -2.422 -0.142 -2.399 
WA  -0.229 -4.116 -0.226 -4.069 
TAS  -0.313 -2.912 -0.314 -2.918 
NT  -0.255 -1.183 -0.252 -1.169 
ACT  -0.056 -0.479 -0.057 -0.491 
      
Number of observations       8307   8307 
Log likelihood function     -4164.4      -4161.4 
Restricted log likelihood     -5131.1      -5131.1 
Chi-squared      1933.5        1939.5 
Significance level      0    0 
          
McFaddens' R
2           0.191   0.192 
Predictions (cutoff=0.4)        
% not studying correct     79.5    79.5 
% studying correct     60.3    60.5 




University Participation at age 18: Probit Results for Students Not Planning to 
Attend University, by Sex 
 
 Persons  Males  Females 






Constant  -1.688  -10.096 -1.092 -5.967 -3.511 -4.541 
1993  0.307 1.614  -0.352  -1.536 2.167 2.768 
1999  0.459 2.574  -0.137  -0.671 2.291 2.946 
Wealth  rank  0.148 0.469  -0.871  -2.136 2.549 2.555 
Wealth  rank  by  1993  0.379 1.068 1.313 2.776  -1.918  -1.875 
Wealth  rank  by  1999  0.280 0.839 1.000 2.268  -1.898  -1.882 
        
Number of observations    4008        1911        2097 
Log likelihood function       -1441.7     -644.3       -771.3 
Restricted log likelihood       -1479.1    -650.7       -823.2 
Chi-squared             74.8          12.9         103.9 
Significance level    0           0.025            0 
         
Hosmer-Lemeshow     16.9    12.1    30.6 
P-value        0.03         0.15       0 
        
McFadden R
2         0.031          0.012         0.054 
Predictions  (cutoff=0.4)        
% not studying correct    96.5    100     79.6 
% studying correct    6.1       0    34.6 





University Participation 1988 and 1989: Probit Results  
 
 Persons 
 B  B/std 
error 
Constant  -1.048 -11.204 
1989 -0.247  -1.199 
Wealth rank  0.531  3.720 
Wealth rank by 1989  0.229  0.725 
1988 Male   0.188  2.322 
1989 Male   -0.121  -0.668 
    
Number of observations     1462 
Log likelihood function       -797.3 
Restricted log likelihood       -812.0 
Chi-squared         29.5 
Significance level   0 
    
Hosmer-Lemeshow        7.49 
P-value         0.485 
    
McFadden R
2         0.028 
Predictions (cutoff=0.25)     
% not studying correct    62.8 
% studying correct    55.3 
% correct    61.1 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 